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I. INTRODUCTION

Numerous rulings by the Supreme Court have confirmed the
long-held assertion that the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement is a "centerpiece for the law of search and seizure, and
that prescreening by neutral and detached magistrates is [at] the
heart of citizens' protection against police overreaching."1 On
September 21, 1994, however, these assertions proved inaccurate and
painfully hollow for Betty Ingram, a fifty-three-year-old diabetic who
awoke to the sound of armed police officers charging through her front
door. 2 The officers, who were searching for a suspect involved in a buyand-bust operation, 3 had neither obtained a search warrant nor
knocked and announced their presence. 4 Mistaking Ingram's son for
the suspect, they proceeded to handcuff and place him on the floor
while pointing their guns at his head. 5 When Ingram's daughter asked
what was happening, the officers told her to "shut up," lacing their
language with expletives. 6 Ingram was hit in the face and knocked
down, then handcuffed and shaken so violently that her head struck
7
the couch repeatedly.
Given the Fourth Amendment's general prohibition on
"unreasonable searches and seizures," and its associated requirement
that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,"8 one might
wonder how Ingram found herself in such appalling circumstances.
Under what authority did the police forcefully, and perhaps
wrongfully, intrude into the home of an innocent citizen? The answer
lies in a subtle jurisprudential shift away from the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement that transpired during the latter
part of the twentieth century.
Over several decades, the Supreme Court has routinely
narrowed the range of cases to which the warrant requirement applies
so that, in practice, warrants have become an exception rather than

1.
William J. Stuntz, Warrantsand Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, L 32
(1991).
2.
Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 1999).
3.
A buy-and-bust operation is "a pre-arranged police operation whereby the police arrest
individuals after they sell narcotics to undercover officers." Id. at 584, n.1.
4.
The plainclothes officers also failed to identify themselves as law enforcement officers.
Id. at 585.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the rule. 9 One scholar catalogued almost twenty such exemptions as of
1985, including searches incident to arrest, automobile searches,
border searches, administrative searches of regulated businesses,
exigent circumstances, searches incident to nonarrest when there is
probable cause to arrest, boat boarding for document checks, welfare
searches, inventory searches, airport searches, school searches,
searches of government employees' offices, and mobile home
searches.10
The exigent circumstances exception used to justify the
warrantless entry in the Ingram case," however, has arguably had
the most dramatic effect on the use of search warrants. In Ingram, for
example, police officers were pursuing Anthony Carroll, a drug
middleman who had taken twenty dollars in marked bills to purchase
crack cocaine for an undercover agent. 12 The officers, who had been in
close interaction with Carroll, were aware that because of his minor
intermediary role, he posed little danger of physical violence; 13 yet,
their pursuit was vigorous and extensive, with three officers following
on foot and several others tracking him in their vehicles. 14 When
Carroll entered the basement of Ingram's residence, he was
surrounded. Without hesitation or thought of procuring a search
warrant, however, the officers deemed the situation "exigent," charged
into the home, and assaulted its blameless residents. Was their
evaluation correct? Did a fugitive drug runner, trapped in the
basement of a home, truly pose a threat serious enough to bypass the
constitutionally mandated warrant otherwise required to search a
private dwelling? Possibly, he did not.1 5 The United States Court of
9.
Stuntz, supra note 1, at 882; see Donald L. Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using
Magistrates, Incentives, and Telecommunications Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 293, 295 (1996) (indicating that exceptions to the warrant
requirement have become so numerous that they have eclipsed the rule itself).
10. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 147374 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
11. 185 F.3d at 588.
12. Id. at 584.
13. Id. at 584. The officers had watched Carroll on the street and interacted with him in
their undercover car. Id. After giving him the marked bills, the officers observed him walking to
a residence and then down another street. Id. Arguably, his activities suggest he was merely a
"runner," a middleman, who would have little knowledge of, or stake in, the drug operation.
14. Id.
15. Justice White's majority opinion in Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), suggests
that the Ingram search may have been unreasonable. In Olson, a suspect involved in the armed
robbery of a gasoline station was tracked to a duplex unit occupied by two women. Id. at 93-94.
Multiple squad cars surrounded the building. Id. at 101. Without seeking a search warrant and
with their weapons drawn, police officers entered the dwelling and arrested the suspect. Id. at
94. In upholding the Minnesota Supreme Court's determination that no exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry, the Supreme Court stressed the following factors:
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, interpreted Supreme Court
precedent to excuse the failure to obtain a warrant on exigent
circumstance grounds.' 6 The factual background of the Ingram case
thus shows the degree to which the exigent circumstances exception
has allowed law enforcement officers to circumvent the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. Even basic phrasing from the
court's opinion underscores the extent of the shift: "[A]bsent exigent
circumstances, police officers may not make a warrantless
nonconsensual entry into a private dwelling." 17 In its affirmative form,
the rule therefore reads that if exigent circumstances exist, then
officers may make a warrantless entry into a private dwelling.
The exception's ability to negate the warrant requirement
depends on the definition and analysis of "exigent." For example, hot
pursuit of a dangerous suspect or the need to prevent the destruction
of evidence may, under certain conditions, justify invocation of the
exigent circumstances exception. Implicit in these rationales, however,
is the more basic assumption that traveling to a courthouse to procure
a warrant may take too long and would unreasonably handicap law
enforcement efforts.18 In 1977, recognizing that the administrative
difficulties of obtaining a warrant were fueling the frequent use of the
"exigency" exception, Congress amended Rule 41 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to permit the issuance of search warrants by
telephone.' 9 Sixteen years later, the Rules were amended again to

[A]lithough a grave crime was involved, respondent "was known not to be the
murderer but thought to be the driver of the getaway car," and that police had already
recovered the murder weapon. "The police knew that... [the two women] were with
the suspect in the upstairs duplex with no suggestion of danger to them. Three or four
Minneapolis police squads surrounded the house.... It was evident the suspect was
going nowhere. If he came out of the house he would have been promptly
apprehended."
Id. at 101. Like Olson, the getaway driver, Carroll was trapped in the basement of a home
surrounded by several police units. Ingram, 185 F.3d at 584. In actuality, he lived with his aunt
and uncle in the building located behind Ingram's home. Id. at 584 n.2. His familiarity with the
Ingram family would have thus provided little incentive to harm them. Like Olson, moreover, he
was not accused of a violent felony, but rather of "offering to sell cocaine." Id. at 584. Clearly,
Carroll had little chance of evading arrest. Factual similarities between Olson and Ingram thus
suggest the search in the latter case was likewise unreasonable.
16. Id. at 598. The appellate court did; however, reverse the dismissal of Ingram's claim of
"unreasonable entry in violation of the Fourth Amendment," because the agents failed to
announce their entrance into her home. Id.
17. Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
18. For a more detailed discussion of the rationale underlying the expanding exigent
circumstances exception and the federal telephonic search warrant procedures, see Part III infra.
19. Michael J. Kuzmich, Review of Selected 1998 California Legislation: Criminal
Procedure: www.warrant.com: Arrest and Search Warrants by E-mail, 30 McGEORGE L. REV.
590, 591 (1999); see United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 843 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1977); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(c)(2).
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allow for the use of facsimile machines in sending and receiving
necessary documents. 20 Under Rule 41(c)(2), federal officers faced with
a situation that might not be sufficiently exigent to justify a
warrantless home search, but which still might risk destruction of
evidence during the time necessary to obtain a traditional warrant,
21
can request one by telephone and receive a relatively quick response.
As technology continues to advance, telephonic and other
electronic communication devices are providing increasingly viable
methods for reinvigorating the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. 22 These readily available technologies should lead courts
to reexamine the exigent circumstances exception and determine
whether, in light of expedited telephonic-facsimile warrant
procedures, the circumstances of a particular case can truly be
considered exigent. 23 Additionally, because telephonic procedures
minimize the ability of law enforcement officers to engage in
warrantless practices that might threaten Fourth Amendment privacy
values, 24 implementation of telephonic search warrant provisions
patterned after the federal model should be encouraged at the state
level. 25 Recent advances in digital imaging, remote video transmission,
cellular communication, and encryption technology should further
enhance the reliability and desirability of telephonic search warrants.
Thus, as new technologies make the connections between field officers
and magistrates "seamless," exceptions to the warrant requirement
should be narrowed just as the requirement itself was narrowed
26
during the past half century.

20. Id.
21. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) advisory committee's note.
22. See generally Beci, supra note 9 (suggesting that telecommunications and computer
technology can help reinvigorate Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Kuzmich, supra note 19
(explaining that California has installed personal computers equipped with E-mail access in
police cruisers and now permits warrants to be requested and issued using those devices).
23. See Edward F. Marek, Telephonic Search Warrants: A New Equation for Exigent
Circumstances, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 35, 36 (1978) (stating that "the availability of telephonic
search warrants affects most directly the body of decisional authority permitting warrantless
searches where exigent circumstances exist").
24. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) advisory committee's note.
25.

See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON

POLICE 95 (1973) (recommending that "every State enact legislation that provides for the
issuance of search warrants pursuant to telephoned petitions and affidavits from police officers").
26. Beci, supra note 9, at 327 (indicating that "the Supreme Court must eliminate or
narrow, some of its previously created exceptions that are no longer necessary due to current
technology"); Paul D. Beechen, Oral Search Warrants:A New Standard of WarrantAvailability,
21 UCLA L. REV. 691, 706 (1973); Marek, supra note 23, at 36 (indicating that the availability of
telephonic or radio-obtained search warrants directly affects the "body of decisional authority
permitting warrantless searches").
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The remainder of this Note proceeds in seven parts. Part II
details the history of the warrant requirement and places particular
emphasis on the textual support and preference for warrants found in
the structure of the Fourth Amendment and in numerous Supreme
Court decisions. In addition, this Part outlines the rationale of the
warrant requirement and its exceptions with the latter section
explaining the importance of the exigent circumstances exception, the
factors used to determine "exigency," and the potential effect the
exception may have on the continued viability of the warrant
requirement. Parts III and IV delineate state and federal telephonic
procedures, while Part V addresses criticisms aimed at electronic
search warrant methods. Part VI discusses the ability of telephonic
provisions to circumscribe the growing exigent circumstances
exception. Part VII explores new technological developments that will
make electronic warrants even more beneficial, and Part VIII
encourages states without such provisions to reevaluate their
positions. This Note concludes by emphasizing that electronic warrant
statutes can help bring about a return to Fourth Amendment values
without sacrificing the interests of law enforcement agents.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. History of the Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment was drafted in response to heavyhanded British law enforcement methods--in particular, the general
search warrant and writ of assistance. 2 7 With the introduction of
printing technology in England during the fifteenth century, the
English monarchy found itself in need of a mechanism to suppress
politically threatening publications. 28 In response, broad search and
seizure powers were conferred upon royal officials as a means of
restricting freedom of the press. 29 A national publication licensing
system implemented under Henry VIII (1509-1547) allowed English
courts to further expand governmental search and seizure powers to
cover seditious printing. 30 This development resulted in virtually
unlimited search powers allowing royal agents to seek out books and
27. See Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77
B.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1997).
28. Anita Eve, Project: Districtof Columbia Court of Appeals Projecton Criminal Procedure:
I. Search Warrants: B. Statutory Right to a Warrant, 26 HOW. L.J. 844, 845 (1983) [hereinafter
Statutory Right to a Warrant].
29. Id.
30. Id.
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other publications. 3 1 By the time George III ascended to the throne in
1760, general warrants effectively allowed "messengers of the king" to
arrest anyone, to search any house to apprehend the authors of
32
alleged libels, and to seize personal property.
General search warrants were used primarily in England, but
customs officers in the American colonies utilized the writ of
assistance to search buildings for smuggled goods. 33 While these
abusive searches were technically conducted with warrants, the writs
of assistance, like general warrants, did not limit governmental
discretion. 34 In 1761, Sir James Otis, the Attorney General of
Massachusetts, vehemently attacked the issuance of new writs,
characterizing them as arbitrary exercises of governmental power that
destroyed fundamental principles of law.3 5 He argued that "a man who
is obedient to the law should be as secure in his home as a prince in
his castle."3 6
Controversy over the writs continued until the Revolutionary
38
War 37 and is considered to be a major impetus in its occurrence.
Keenly aware of the inequities stemming from abuse of the writs and
general search warrants, the Framers of the Constitution set about
crafting a system that would curb governmental discretion to search
and seize. 39 When the lack of a constitutional provision addressing
searches and the right of privacy became an issue during the
ratification debates, 40 James Madison drafted the Fourth Amendment:
The Right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

31.

Id. The national licensing system required all publications to receive the nation's license

or be destroyed. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT § 1.1(a) (3d ed. 1996) (indicating that the national licensing system implemented in
1538 conferred vast search powers on those who enforced the system, allowing the Star Chamber
and the Parliament to authorize virtually unlimited searches for books and other publications).
32. Statutory Right to a Warrant, supra note 28, at 846.
33. Id. at 848; LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 1.1(a); see generally Maclin, supra note 27.
34. Beci, supra note 9, at 303.
35. Statutory Right to a Warrant, supra note 28, at 846; see LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 1.1(a).
36. Statutory Right to a Warrant, supra note 28, at 848.
37. Id. at 849.
38. Beci, supra note 9, at 303.
39. Id.
40. Statutory Right to a Warrant, supra note 28, at 849.
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B. Textual Support for the Warrant Requirement
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not expressly
contain a requirement that a warrant be obtained before the
government can conduct a home search, the historical background
surrounding the Amendment's enactment, 41 along with the structure
of its two clauses, 42 suggests a strong constitutional preference for
warrants. In particular, the first clause of the Fourth Amendment
protects the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures while the second "Warrant Clause" sets forth
informational and procedural prerequisites that must be satisfied
before a warrant may be issued. 43 If the clauses are presumed to be
interdependent, then the safeguards of the Warrant Clause define the
reasonableness of a given search or seizure. 44 Police must thus obtain
a warrant prior to any intrusion unless compelling reasons exist for
proceeding without one. 45 As Justice Stevens concluded for the
majority in Payton v. New York, "Unreasonable searches or seizures
conducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain
46
language of the first clause of the Amendment."
C. Supreme Court Precedent Supporting the Warrant Requirement
Notwithstanding the unwillingness of certain Justices to
support the warrant requirement, the Court, for more than one
hundred years, has expressed a strong preference for warrants. 4 7 On
numerous occasions, the Court has noted that law enforcement agents
"must secure and use search warrants whenever reasonably
practicable" 48 and that in doubtful or marginal cases, a search under a

41. See generally Beci, supra note 9, at 300-05 (discussing historical evidence in support of
the warrant requirement and noting that the requirement is consistent with the Framers' intent
to limit the government's power to search and seize).
42.

See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.01(a), 159 n.1 (2d

ed. 1997).
43. See id.
44. See Maclin, supra note 27, at 928.
45. Id. An alternate interpretation of the Fourth Amendment asserts that its two clauses
are independent. Under this approach, the Reasonableness Clause mandates a universal rule
that all searches and seizures be reasonable. If police obtain a warrant, the second clause
ensures its validity; however, if the police forgo the warrant procedure, the search need only be
reasonable to withstand constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 927-28.
46. 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
47. See Beci, supra note 9, at 294 ("For more than a century the Supreme Court has
stressed the importance of the warrant requirement.").
48. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948).
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warrant may be sustainable where a search without a warrant would
fail. 49
In 1877, Ex parte Jackson was one of the Court's first cases to
address significantly the right of persons to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 50 In Jackson, the petitioner was convicted of
knowingly and unlawfully depositing a (sealed) envelope in the United
States mail containing circulars which described a lottery.5 1 Section
3894 of the revised statutes of the Act of March 3, 1873 made such an
action punishable by a fine of up to $500 in addition to the costs of
prosecution. 52 On review, the Court indicated that "the constitutional
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, ... closed
against inspection, wherever they may be." 53 A sealed letter, the Court
held, could therefore only be opened and examined with a warrant
issued on oath or affirmation and particularly describing the things to
be seized. 54 Justice Field, writing for the majority, indicated that all
regulations and laws adopted as to mailed matter were subordinate to
55
"the great principle embodied in the [F]ourth [A]mendment."
In Weeks v. United States, the Court confronted another
situation in which a petitioner was convicted of using the United
States Postal Service to transmit lottery information. 56 Unlike in
Jackson, however, police officers and federal marshals had engaged in
two warrantless searches of the petitioner's home to obtain the
evidence introduced at trial. A unanimous Court held that introducing
the petitioner's letters and papers taken from his home without a
search warrant constituted prejudicial error and was violative of the
57
accused's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Some of the clearest statements expressing the strong
preference for searches conducted pursuant to Warrants, however, can
be found in opinions from the late-1960s and 1970s. In 1969, for
example, the Court decided Chimel v. California,58 which involved a
49. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965); see United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 423 (1976) (indicating that "officers may find it wise to seek arrest warrants where
practicable to do so, and their judgments about probable cause may be more readily accepted
where backed by a warrant issued by a magistrate").
50. 96 U.S. 727 (1877); see Statutory Right to a Warrant, supra note 28, at 850.
51. Statutory Right to a Warrant, supra note 28, at 850.
52. Id.
53. Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
57. Id. at 386.
58. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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warrantless search of the petitioner's entire home pursuant to an
arrest warrant. Finding the search and subsequent seizure unlawful
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court stressed
that "police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
59
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure."
Two years later, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Court reiterated
what it considered the "most basic constitutional rule" regarding
searches and seizures: "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 60 Justice Stevens later
applied this maxim to a dwelling search, concluding that warrantless
61
searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively invalid.
D. Rationale of the WarrantRequirement
The essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
citizens from unwarranted intrusions into their privacy. 62 The
preference for warrants effectively furthers this objective by
interposing a neutral and detached magistrate between law
enforcement officers and private citizens. As articulated by Justice
Jackson in Johnson v. United States,
The point of the Fourth Amendment['s warrant requirement], which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
63
crime.

Simply put, prosecutors and police officers cannot be expected
to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own
investigations. 64 Magistrates, conversely, are in a better position to
determine reasonableness and probable cause without bias, haste, or
competitiveness. 65 Thus, warrantless searches and seizures are not
59. Id. at 762 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1968)).
60. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
61. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
62. Id. at 588.
63. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). Justice Stewart, in Chimel, also
stressed the importance of the Fourth Amendment in light of the partiality of law enforcement
officers: "[T]he Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the
police ...

not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities ...

[but]

so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the
law." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761.
64. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 450.
65. See Beci, supra note 9, at 310.
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unreasonable because they are condemned by the text of the Fourth
Amendment, but because they qualify as intrusions into another's
privacy without the approval of a neutral, objective decisionmaker.6 6
Relegating the determination of probable cause to neutral
magistrates also helps ensure more accurate, uniform judgments of
probable cause for two reasons. First, magistrates, unlike police
officers, regularly have opportunities to participate in continuing legal
education programs focused on developments in search and seizure
laws.6 7 Their determinations of probable cause and reasonableness
will thus inevitably be more accurate than similar assessments made
by law enforcement officers. 68 Second, having fewer magistrates
involved in the decisionmaking process, combined with their superior
training, means that their conclusions will be more consistent than
the equivalent determinations made by officers in the field. 69 Thus to
ensure the accuracy, uniformity, and objectivity of probable cause
determinations, "the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the
'70
desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home.
A final advantage to the warrant requirement is that the
application and approval process generates a contemporaneous record
for review.7 1 If issued, the warrant outlines the scope of the search and
the government's basis for determining probable cause. Such
documentation eliminates the need for a court to make difficult post
hoc determinations as to what actually occurred based on conflicting
testimony from officers and subjects of a search. A warrantless search,
however, does not share this benefit.
E. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
Despite the multiple advantages of the warrant requirement,
situations invariably arise where warrants are insufficient to justify
either the additional burden placed on police officers or the harm to
society that would result from a delay in enforcement efforts. For
example, a long-standing exception recognized by the common law at
the time of the Fourth Amendment's framing, permits warrantless
searches and arrests of persons who commit felonies in the presence of

66. Maclin, supra note 27, at 938.
67. Beci, supra note 9, at 311.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 455 (1948)).

71.

Beci, supra note 9, at 311.
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law enforcement officers. 72 This exception has been endorsed by the
Supreme Court and recognized by statute in almost every state as
necessary to seize weapons or other objects which might be used to
assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as to prevent the
destruction of evidence. 73 In addition, police officers may search not
only the arrestees, but any areas into which the' arrestees might
reach-technically defined as the area within their immediate
74
control-based on the same rationales.
Not all law enforcement actions incident to arrest, however, are
permissible. For example, police officers may not search other parties
who happen to be in a place occupied by a suspect without a prior
finding of probable cause, 75 nor may they execute a warrantless search
of a person's home in order to make a felony arrest.76 The latter
restriction exists not to protect the person of the suspect but to protect
his home from entry in the absence of a magistrate's finding of
probable cause.
Illustrated by Sir James Otis's famous phrase, a man's home is
his castle, 77 the home-search warrant restriction has a strong
foundation in the history of the Fourth Amendment and in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. 78 On numerous occasions the Justices
have stated that "at the very core of the ... Amendment stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion,"79 and that "the Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house." 80 In
recent decades, however, the Court has been willing to disregard the
Warrant Clause's paramount concern for the protection of private
dwellings by liberalizing the exigent circumstances exception. 81 As
stated in Minnesota v. Olson, a warrantless intrusion based on exigent
circumstances may be justified "by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or
imminent destruction of evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect's
escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or

72. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976).
73. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 n.31 (1980).
74. Payton, 445 U.S. at 618, 763; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
75. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
76. See generally Payton, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
77. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
78. For an excellent review of Fourth Amendment history and Supreme Court precedent
supporting the home-search warrant requirement, see Beci, supra note 9, at 300-09.
79. Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)).
80. Id. at 590.
81. Beci, supra note 9, at 294.
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outside the dwelling."8 2 The Court has intimated, however, that an
even broader range of exigent circumstances might excuse the failure
to obtain a warrant authorizing a home arrest entry.8 3 Its current
formulation actually makes the warrant requirement subject to an
initial qualification, effectively relegating it to a position of secondary
importance: In the absence of exigent circumstances, police officers
84
may not make a warrantless home entry to arrest a suspect.
Like the majority of exemptions from the warrant requirement,
the exigent circumstances exception represents a balancing of law
enforcement's legitimate needs against citizens' privacy interests. The
factors used to determine "exigency" underscore this notion and
typically include: (1) the gravity of the offense; (2) the likelihood that a
suspect is armed; (3) probable cause to believe that the suspect
committed the crime involved; (4) reason to believe the suspect is
inside the premises being entered; (5) the likelihood that the suspect
will escape if not swiftly apprehended; (6) the likelihood of making a
peaceable, although nonconsensual, entry; and (7) the time of day
when the warrant is sought.85 By delineating each of the elements in
the exigent circumstances exception, the Court has attempted to
achieve equipoise between law enforcement interests and citizens'
privacy rights.
One additional factor, the time necessary to obtain a warrant,
has also been integrated into the exigent circumstances analysis. In
United States v. McEachin, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that officers faced exigent circumstances
when they learned that a suspect intended to dispose of a gun used
during a robbery. 8 6 In reaching this conclusion, the court indicated
that "the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant by traditional
means has always been considered in determining whether
circumstances are exigent. 8 7 Because the delay would have impeded
efforts to prevent the removal of a deadly weapon from the suspect's
apartment, the court found a warrant to be unnecessary.
Exactly how long a delay is needed before officers can forgo the
warrant requirement inevitably depends on the particular facts of the

82: 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
83. LAFAVE, supranote 31, § 1.1(a).
84. See generally Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S: 204 (1981); Payton, 445 U.S. 573.
85. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 31, §6.1(0 (detailing the above factors and citing
hundreds of court decisions that have used the factors in their analyses).
86. 670 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
87. Id. at 1146; see also United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 589 (10th Cir. 1983)
(indicating that "the time necessary to obtain a warrant is relevant to a determination whether
circumstances are exigent").
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situation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
suggested that a delay of "at least a few hours" in combination with
the possibility of imminent removal or destruction of contraband or a
potential
threat to human life would constitute
exigent
88
circumstances; yet, the same court found that a delay of only oneand-a-half to two hours would unduly burden law enforcement efforts
when distributable contraband substances were involved.8 9 Thus it
might be possible that a delay of less than one hour, given the right
set of facts, could justify noncompliance with the warrant
requirement.
As the law currently stands, there are more than twenty
exceptions to the warrant requirement, 90 a development which
prompted one commentator to assert that it has been eclipsed by its
numerous exceptions. 91 The overwhelming majority, however, apply in
relatively well-defined circumstances. For example, exceptions
allowing officers to search curbside garbage, 92 privately owned open
fields, 93 and mobile homes 94 without a warrant are fairly limited in
their application because of the precise nature of the situations to
which they apply. The exigent circumstances exception, conversely, is
not limited in this way. Instead, its multifactor analysis makes it
applicable to a wide variety of situations, giving it an accordion-like
ability to expand or contract. The growing applicability of the exigent
circumstances exception is arguably the greatest threat to the
continued viability of the warrant requirement.
A substantial factor contributing to the exception's increasing
use is the time needed to obtain a warrant. 95 More specifically, given
the rate of population growth in the United States, the emergence of
new forms of crime and terrorism, and the nation's ceaseless
commitment to the war on drugs, it is unlikely that the country will
96
experience a significant decrease in crime for the foreseeable future.
88. See United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
89. See United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
90. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Beci, supra note 9, at 295.
92. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
93. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
94. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
95. Marek, supra note 23, at 36.
96. According to Uniform Crime Reports, which collects data on violent crime reports and
arrests in the United States, the number of reported violent crimes from 1990 to 2000 fluctuated
between 1,556,800 (1990) and 1,222,500 (2000). See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics,
Four
Measures
of
Serious
Violent
Crime,
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/4meastab.htm (Oct. 22, 2001). While these statistics
suggest an overall decrease in violent crime, it is apparent that the United States is still
grappling with a significant crime problem.
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Law enforcement departments and the judicial system are already
overburdened with substantial backlogs of cases. 97 Each request for a
warrant will therefore contribute further to the existing overload. As
workloads increase more rapidly than budget adjustments, each
request requiring judicial attention will inevitably take longer to
complete until, at some point, the administrative difficulty of filing
and processing a warrant application may take too long to justify the
burden on law enforcement. 98 At that time, the exigent circumstances
exception will have eclipsed the warrant requirement itself. In short,
these sociological developments, which have strengthened the "timeto-procure-a-warrant" element critical to a finding of exigent
circumstances, have expanded the applicability of the exception and
resulted in a corresponding decrease in the strength of the warrant
requirement. In effect, the exception's time variable has tipped the
balance of governmental and private interests in favor of law
enforcement officials.

III. TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANTS: FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 41(C)(2)
In 1977, recognizing that the administrative difficulty of
obtaining warrants was contributing to their nonuse, Congress
amended Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to allow
magistrates to authorize search warrants over the telephone. 99 The
end result was subsection 41(c)(2), embodying methodological
innovations that maintain the essential safeguards of the warrant
request process while also expediting the procedure. 10 0
Rule 41(c)(2) authorizes magistrates to issue a warrant based
upon sworn testimony communicated by telephone or other

97.

See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS; CRISIS AND REFORM, 59-166

(1985) (discussing the 'litigation crisis" that has contributed to the backlog of cases in the federal

system); see, e.g., Backlog Jams Courtrooms in Pierce County, available at
http://www.oregonlive.com/news/99/08/stO80315.html (Aug. 3, 1999) (explaining that citizens
filing civil suits in Superior Court in Pierce County, Washington can expect two to three-year
delays in getting their cases to court).
98. See Jerold H. Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches and Seizures: The Michigan
Proposals, 73 MICH. L. REV. 221, 256 (1974) (noting that "the first obstacle [to obtaining a
warrant] is finding an available magistrate") (emphasis added); Marek, supra note 23, at 36
(indicating that exigent circumstances have been found "where obtaining a timely search
warrant by the traditional method of an affiant appearing before a magistrate would, in effect, be
unreasonable because of conditions then existing' and emphasizing that 'lapse of time in
obtaining a warrant and the unavailability of a magistrate or state judge have been the usual
obstacles").
99. See supra text accompanying note 19.
100. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) advisory committee's note.
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appropriate
means, including facsimile
transmission, when
circumstances make it reasonable to dispense. with a written
affidavit. 10 1 In general, the officer requesting a telephonic warrant
must prepare a "duplicate original warrant" containing information
that would normally be provided by an affiant in front of a
magistrate. 10 2 After describing the circumstances of time and place
which make it reasonable to request the issuance of a warrant based
on oral testimony 03 and after being placed under oath, 10 4 the officer
must then read the duplicate original warrant verbatim to the federal
magistrate who will document the conversation using a recording
device or stenographic transcript. 10 5 If the magistrate determines that
probable cause exists to justify the search, the magistrate will direct
the requesting officer to sign the duplicate warrant while the
magistrate signs and dates the original. 10 6 Copies of these documents
10 7
are then filed at the courthouse.
Notes from the Advisory Committee and transcripts from the
House and Senate debates suggest that the amendment was intended
to circumscribe use of the exigent circumstances exception. 0 8 The
Committee expressly noted in its report on the Supreme Court
proposal that the preferred method of conducting a search was with a
search warrant and that the rationale of the proposed rule change was
to encourage federal law enforcement officers to seek search warrants
whenever practicable. 0 9 To clarify its reasoning, the Committee
stated:
One reason for the nonuse of the warrant has been the administrative difficulties
involved in getting a warrant, particularly at times of the day when a judicial officer is
typically unavailable.... Federal law enforcement officers are not infrequently
confronted with situations in which the circumstances are not sufficiently exigent to
justify the serious step of conducting a warrantless search of private premises, but yet
there exists a significant possibility that critical evidence will be lost in the time it
would take to obtain a search warrant by traditional means.. .. The unavailability of (a

101. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2).
102. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(B).
103. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A) ("If the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense, in
whole or in part, with a written affidavit, a [flederal magistrate judge may issue a warrant based
upon sworn testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means.").
104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(D).
105. Id.
106. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(C).
107. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(D).
108. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2), Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1977 Amendment,
reprinted in 19 U.S.C. App., at 1672-73, 1674 (Supp. III 1979) (citations omitted).
109. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) advisory committee's notes.
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telephonic warrant) procedure .. makes more tempting an immediate resort to a
warrantless search.11°

It is clear that the Committee intended the availability of the
telephonic procedure to discourage federal law enforcement officers
from engaging in other practices, under cover of the exigent
circumstances exception, which might threaten values protected by
the Fourth Amendment."1 Moreover, both the House and Senate
specifically referred to the quoted language from the Advisory
Committee's notes to stress that the revised rule should make it more
administratively feasible to procure a warrant, thereby encouraging
federal officers to use them. 11 2 Based on these unambiguous records,
federal courts, in dealing with Rule 41(c)(2), have concluded that the
telephonic provision was intended to encourage officers to use the
expedited electronic procedure, particularly where the existence of
11 3
exigent circumstances is a close question.
IV. ADOPTION OF TELEPHONIC PROCEDURES BY STATES
The success of the telephonic procedure in both the federal
system and in Arizona and California, whose provisions predated Rule
41(c)(2), has encouraged other jurisdictions to adopt similar statutes
authorizing the use of "electronic" warrants.1 1 4 Alaska, Colorado,
Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, and South Dakota,
among others, have enacted some form of telephonic procedure using
elements from the federal model. Review of the basic contours of these
states' codes highlights several core similarities while also illustrating
how the federal model can be successfully adapted to suit various
states' needs. Moreover, procedures not explicit in the federal rule, but
common to several of the state codes may provide guidance to other
jurisdictions developing their own electronic warrant provisions.

110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2), advisory committee's notes, 1977 Amendment, reprinted in 19
U.S.C. app., at 1672-73, 1674 (Supp. III 1979) (citations omitted).
111. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2), advisory committee's note.
112. S.REP. No. 354, at 10 (1977); H.R. REP. NO: 195, at 10 (1977).
113. United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 588 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. McEachin,
670 F.2d 1139, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
114. See Miller, Telephonic Search Warrants: The San Diego Experience, 9 PROSECUTOR 385,
386 (1974) (noting a dramatic increase in law enforcement agents' utilization of the warrant
process following the enactment of California's telephonic warrant statute);- see also NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE,
Recommendation 4.2 (1973) (urging that every state enact legislation similar to the federal rule).
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A. Alaska
Alaska's Code of Criminal Procedure closely follows the federal
rule and provides for the issuance of search warrants upon testimony
communicated "by telephone or other means." 11 5 The statute specifies
that, where personal appearance before a magistrate would cause a
delay that could result in loss or destruction of evidence, field officers
may either present oral testimony via telephone or transmit a sworn
affidavit by facsimile. 116 As under the federal rule, the magistrate is
required to place the caller under oath, document the proceeding using
a "voice recording device," and note the exact time when the warrant
was executed. 117 When the request is made by phone, the officer must
prepare a duplicate original warrant and, after receiving
authorization, sign the magistrate's name on the document.1 1 8 Where
a facsimile is available, the magistrate may transmit the search
warrant directly to the applicant, thus making preparation of a
duplicate original warrant unnecessary. 11 9
B. Arizona
Arizona, one of the two states whose electronic search warrant
procedure predated the federal model, has a clause similar to Alaska's
provision. Section 13-3915(d) of Arizona's Revised Statutes indicates
that if a peace officer applying for a warrant is not in the physical
presence of the magistrate, the magistrate may orally authorize him
to sign the magistrate's name on a duplicate warrant prepared by the
officer at his remote location. 120 The magistrate is then required to
write the exact date and time of execution on the "original" warrant in
his possession. 121 Interestingly, no specific provision limits the
application process to telephones or facsimiles. Thus, the statute
appears to allow for the use of new technologies as they are developed.
C. California
California, another early adopter of electronic warrant
procedures, has been the most progressive state in expanding tile

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.015 (Michie 2000).
§ 12.35.015(a)(1)-(2).
§ 12.35.015(b), (d).
§ 12.35.015(c)-(d).
§ 12.35.015(g).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3915(d) (2001).
§ 13-3915(d).
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methods by which an officer may apply for a search warrant. Like
Alaska and Arizona, California allows a magistrate to take an oral
statement made under oath from a field officer via telephone. 122 In
addition, because the State has equipped the majority of its police
cruisers with personal computers, 123 the applying officer may also
send his written, signed proposal to the magistrate via facsimile
transmission.1 24 If the magistrate decides that probable cause exists,
he may then complete the warrant, sign it, and send it back to the
officer via facsimile, noting the exact date and time of execution on the
copy retained at the courthouse. 125 In the event such transmission is
unavailable, a magistrate may authorize the officer to sign his name
1 26
on a "duplicate" original warrant prepared on location.
In 1998, California amended its telephonic search warrant
statute to include electronic mail as an acceptable method of
application. 127 An officer's oath can still be taken over the telephone,
but "the warrant application and all supporting documents may [also]
be transmitted using ... e-mail."1 28 A digital signature is further
required from the officer to ensure the application's authenticity.1 29
Under the new provision, a magistrate who decides to issue a warrant
130
may return it to the applicant via either facsimile or electronic mail.
D. Colorado
Colorado, in its revised statutes, takes a more conservative
approach to electronic warrants than does California. Although its
provision applies to both the application for and issuance of search
warrants, the only alternate mode of submission is by facsimile.
Specifically, the rule indicates that "a warrant, signed affidavit and
accompanying papers may be transmitted by electronic fax
transmission ... to the judge, who may act upon the transmitted
papers as if they were originals."1 31 In addition, a warrant affidavit
may be affirmed by oath administered over the telephone to the
applicant. The rule, however, specifically prohibits a court from

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(c) (Deering 2001).
See Kuzmich, supranote 19, at 592 n.17.
§ S17(c)(2)(A).
§ 817(c)(1)(2)(A)-(D).
§ 1528(b).
§ 817 amendments.
§ 817(c)(2)(A)-(D); Kuzmich, supra note 19, at 593-94.
§ 817(c)(2)(A).
§ 817(c)(2)(D).
131. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(3).
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issuing a warrant "without having in its possession either the original
or the fax copy of the signed affidavit"-a qualification which
132
precludes use of the telephone alone to obtain a search warrant.
E. Idaho
Idaho, like Colorado, employs a more circumscribed approach
to electronic search warrants. Rule 41(c) of the Idaho Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires that an applicant-officer present his
sworn affidavit in the physical presence of a district judge or
magistrate. 133 Subsection three, however, allows an issuing judicial
officer to send a copy of the search warrant by "telecommunications
134
process or ...facsimile" to any police officer serving the warrant.
Thus, although the Idaho rule allows for both telephone and facsimile
procedures, it restricts their use to the issuance of search warrants
and eliminates a field officer's ability to apply for such authorization
electronically, a major benefit to any e-warrant procedure.
F. Illinois
Illinois's updated warrant statute also may be characterized as
applying to the electronic issuance, but not to the application, of a
search warrant. Specifically, the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure
allows
search warrants
to
"be issued
electronically , or
electromagnetically by use of a facsimile transmission machine" and
emphasizes that "such search warrants shall have the same validity
as a written search warrant.' 1 35 It also states, however, that a warrant
will be issued "upon the written complaint of any person under oath or
affirmation."'' 36 Although appearing to leave room for transcribed,
sworn telephonic statements, the Illinois Court of Appeals for the
Third District ruled that the language of the statute does not include
"authorization for long-distance factual findings by telephone and for
oral issuance of a warrant." 137 Illinois's procedure thus allows only for
the electronic issuance of search warrants, eliminating (as does the
Idaho rule) the significant advantage of expedited application.

132. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(3).
133. IDAHO R. CRIM. P.41(c) (2001) (stating that a "[w]arrant shall issue only on an affidavit
or affidavits sworn to before a district judge or magistrate or by testimony under oath and
recorded and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant") (emphasis added).
134. IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(3).
135. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/108-4 (2001).

136. 5/108-3 (emphasis added).
137. Illinois v. Taylor, 555 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
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G. Minnesota
Minnesota has adopted a rule of criminal procedure concerning
facsimile transmissions which specifies that they "may be used for the
sending of all complaints, orders, summons, ....
and arrest and search
warrants. 138 The Rule maintains the same heightened evidentiary
standard associated with traditional written applications by
mandating that the normal procedural and statutory requirements,
including documentation of the proceedings, be met. It further
emphasizes that "a facsimile order or warrant ... shall have the same

9
force and effect as the original." 13
Although the* statute makes, no reference to electronic
application procedures, the Minnesota Supreme Court has explicitly
endorsed Federal Rule 41(c)(2). In State v. Andries, for example, the
court upheld the validity of a telephonic search warrant issued
pursuant to procedures "remarkably similar" to those in the federal
rule. 140 It reached this conclusion even though (1) Minnesota had no
rule setting forth the procedures followed by the officers, and (2) the
warrant process used violated a Minnesota statute requiring the
issuing judge to sign the warrant.14 1 In a more recent opinion, the
Minnesota Supreme Court added that the telephonic procedure should
be used "where the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense with
a written affidavit"--for example, when the place to be searched is a
significant distance from the magistrate, when the agent cannot reach
the magistrate in his office during regular office hours, and when
delay would create a risk that evidence might be destroyed. 42 Thus,
through case law and statutory 'developments, Minnesota has
endorsed the equivalent of Federal Rule 41(c)(2).

H. Nebraska
Nebraska specifically allows for the application and issuance of
a search warrant using telephonic procedures similar to those of the
federal model; however, it interposes a county attorney between the
warrant applicant and the issuing magistrate to assess the necessity
of forgoing the traditional written process.' 43 Under Nebraska's
138. MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 33.05.
139. Id.
140. 297 N.W.2d 124, 125 (Minn. 1980).
141. Id.; see State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Minn. 1991); see also MINN. STAT.
§§626.05, .11 (2001).
142. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d at 863.
143. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-814.03 (Michie 1999).
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statute, a police officer requesting a telephonic warrant is required to
contact the county attorney (or a deputy county attorney) for the
county in which the warrant is to be issued to explain the need for a
telephonic search warrant. 144 If the attorney is satisfied that the
telephonic procedure is justified, he or she contacts the magistrate and
provides a number where the requesting officer can be reached.145 The
magistrate may then call the officer, place him under oath, and record
146
and transcribe his statement.
If probable cause exists, the magistrate follows procedures
virtually identical to those of the federal model. First, the magistrate
may direct the officer to prepare a duplicate warrant, sign his name,
and specify the date and time of issuance on the document. 147 Second,
the magistrate completes the original warrant with the same
information. 148 The Nebraska statute, however, makes the continued
validity of the warrant dependent on the magistrate's signing of the
duplicate warrant when it is filed at the courthouse. 149 Aside from the
additional requirement of independent assessment by the county
attorney and an explicit requirement that the issuing magistrate sign
the duplicate warrant, the Nebraska statute closely follows the federal
guidelines.
I. South Dakota
South Dakota law, in multiple statutory sections, authorizes
the use of telephones, facsimiles, and other appropriate means for the
application and issuance of search warrants. Section 23A-35-5 of
South Dakota's Codified Laws explicitly allows the use of sworn oral
testimony from a person who is not in the physical presence of a
150
magistrate for the purpose of determining probable cause.
Telephones and "other appropriate means" are listed as acceptable
media of communication. 15 1 As a safeguard, a magistrate may require
the officer or prosecuting attorney "to read to him verbatim the
contents of the [duplicate] warrant."' 52 If satisfied, the magistrate will
144. § 29-814.03 (explaining that the "county-attorney-contact" requirement may actually
decrease the time needed to obtain a telephonic warrant); see infra notes 184-88 and
accompanying text.
145. § 29-814.03.

146.
147.
148.
149.

§ 29-814.03.
§ 29-814.05(1).
§ 29-814.05(2).
§ 29-814.05(4).

150. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35-5 (Michie 2001).

151. Id.
152. § 23A-35-6.
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then direct the officer to sign his name on the warrant and, in turn,
will write the exact date and time of execution on the original
document. 153 When the duplicate is filed at the courthouse, the affiant

is further required "to sign a copy of it.154
In situations where a facsimile is available, section 23A-35-4.2
authorizes its use by a committing magistrate to "receive an affidavit
in support of the issuance of a search warrant and ... [to] issue a
search warrant by the same method." 155 Like the Minnesota statute,
the South Dakota rule indicates that all applicable procedural and
statutory requirements must be met for the warrant to be valid and
enforceable and that the facsimile shall have the same force and effect
as an original warrant prepared by a magistrate.1 56 As an additional
safeguard, the requesting officer must document that the magistrate
signed the original warrant before it can be executed. 157
J. Overview of State Procedures
Based on the foregoing review, the various electronic warrant
procedures can be divided into three general categories. First, a few
states (Idaho and Illinois) have taken a circumscribed approach,
allowing only electronic issuance, but not application, of search
warrants. Their statutory provisions allow only for the electronic
issuance of search warrants but do not include corresponding
application procedures.15 8 While such statutes cannot take full
advantage of all emerging communication technologies, the ability of a
judicial magistrate to issue a warrant by electronic means can still aid
law enforcement efforts by allowing one officer to apply for a search
warrant while others wait for approval and transmission near the
suspect's location. 159 Colorado's electronic warrant procedure falls into
an intermediate category, allowing both application for and issuance
of search warrants by electronic means. A written or "hard" copy,
however, is required before a magistrate may issue a warrant-a
provision which disallows the use of only the telephone for an
application. The third category is composed of states which have
153. Id.
154. § 23A-35-7.
155. § 23A-35-4.2.
156. Id.
157. Id. Note, however, that receipt of the facsimile warrant constitutes proof that the
committing magistrate has signed the warrant. See § 23A-35.4.2.
158. See supra Part IV.E-F.
159. Presumably, these states have refrained from further expanding their telephonic search
warrant procedures because of the drawbacks which some commentators have indicated are
inherent in these processes. For a more detailed discussion of these criticisms, see infra Part V.
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adopted electronic warrant procedures most similar to the federal
model, including Alaska, Arizona, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
and South Dakota. 160 Like Federal Rule 41(c)(2), these states'
provisions allow for both application and issuance of search warrants
by electronic means without additional restrictions, like those imposed
by the Colorado Code. Because of the unique demographics and needs
of each jurisdiction, however, variation exists within the group.
Nebraska, for example, has interposed a county attorney between the
officer and the judicial magistrate to streamline the information that
an applicant includes in his or her request, which makes the
determination of probable cause less complicated. 6 1 In general,
however, the procedures in these states closely approximate the
federal guidelines and allow law enforcement officials to take full
advantage of emerging communication technologies to procure search
warrants.
V. CRITICISMS OF TELEPHONIC PROCEDURES:

Presumably, the variance in existing electronic warrant
statutes and the failure of some states to adopt any form of telephonic
provision has resulted from two major criticisms of the procedure.
Challengers of electronic warrants based on oral affidavits disparage
both (1) the lack of demeanor evidence and (2) the absence of a written
162
record for a magistrate to review before issuing a search warrant.
Lack of face-to-face interaction between a judicial officer and an
affiant, it is argued, prevents a credibility assessment based on
behavioral or other nonverbal cues. Furthermore, the lack of "hard"
documentation may compound the problem by making it more difficult
for a magistrate to evaluate the relevant facts fully when determining
the existence of probable 'cause. 1 3 These criticisms, however, are
unfounded and should not be viewed as legitimate barriers to enacting
electronic warrant procedures.
With regard to the lack of demeanor evidence from which a
magistrate could make credibility assessments, several facts
surrounding the warrant application procedure, as well as recent
technological advances, render this criticism baseless. First, the
demeanor objection implicitly assumes that magistrates carefully
observe affiants and make fine discriminations based on behavioral
cues. While those unfamiliar with the criminal justice system may
160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra Part IV.A, B, C, G, H, I.
See supra Part lV.H.
Beechen, supra note 26, at 701; Israel, supra note 98, at 261.
Id.
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believe that magistrates scrupulously review evidence and
meticulously question affiants, in reality, warrant applications are
often approved after only minimal inspection. 164 As Professor LaFave
has indicated, "[I]n those locales where the judge signs the warrant
himself, he will at most merely scan the documents[;] [o]ften the
warrant is signed without any examination of its contents. 16 5
This lack of scrutiny, however, may be more logical than it first
appears. For example, an affiant in a warrant application proceeding
is frequently a police officer who has had substantial exposure to the
courtroom setting.1 66 An inevitable effect is that the "nervous"
behavioral cues associated with lying (i.e., decreased pupilary size,
sweating, blinking, lowered gaze, etc.) will not be as obvious to the
magistrate as they would be in the case of an ordinary citizen who is
unfamiliar with the warrant application process.1 67 Moreover, even
though a magistrate using conventional telephone equipment may not
be able to visually evaluate the affiant, he still has the opportunity to
examine the caller or requesting officer orally. This benefit appears to
be far more significant than merely observing an applicant who has
received his information from another individual. 168 As one California
court has stated,
The essence of the [telephonic warrant] statute is not to require a face-to-face
confrontation between the magistrate and the affiant, but that the magistrate shall
have an opportunity to examine the affiant should any questions arise in his mind
concerning any of the allegations in the affidavit or of the sufficiency of the affidavit as a
69

whole.1

Moreover, both the state electronic warrant procedures and the
federal model require that a requesting officer be placed under oath
before making a declaration of fact.1 70 This solemn duty to tell the
truth should further weigh against a magistrate's need for demeanor
evidence. 171 Law enforcement agents, for example, frequently interact
with the same judicial officers. This repeated interaction arguably
encourages them to be truthful and discourages the use of inaccurate

164. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY, 34
(1965).
165. Id.
166. Beechen, supra note 26, at 702.
167. Id. at 702-03.
168. Israel, supra note 98, at 261.
169. People v. Chavez, 27 Cal. App. 3d 883, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
170. See supra Parts III, IV.
171. See United States ex rel. Pugh v. Pate, 401 F.2d 6, 7 (7th Cir. 1968) (specifying that the
oath requirement is significant because it forces the requesting officer to take ultimate
responsibility for the facts alleged).
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or false statements while under oath. 17 2 If an officer were to disregard
this obligation, it would likely result in substantial damage to his
professional reputation, which in turn could ultimately affect his
ability to enforce the law. The oath requirement thus ameliorates the
need for demeanor evidence by making it less probable that an officer
would perjure himself to procure a warrant.
The demeanor criticism is also less justifiable in light of recent
technological advances. With the integration of personal computers
into police cruisers across the nation, field officers have become linked
to each other and to their judicial counterparts in ways that were
previously not possible. 173 Many patrol cars are now equipped with
dash-mounted miniature video cameras which record stops to preserve
evidence in the event charges are filed against either the state or the
arrestee. 74 In addition, many are outfitted with cellular transmission
technology enabling them to send and receive information to police
headquarters or to other officers on patrol.1 75 Thus, existing
technology could easily be adapted to transmit a visual signal of the
requesting agent to a magistrate in his chambers making "remote"
face-to-face application possible. This combination would clearly weigh
against the demeanor criticism by allowing a magistrate to question a
warrant applicant and monitor his responses. As an added benefit, a
field officer also could transmit images of events or items in plain view
172. See id.
173. See Beci, supra note 9, at 319-21.
174. Tom Jackman, Police Enter Video Era, Cameras Installed on Five Cruisers, WASH.
POST, Apr. 13, 2000, at V1 (indicating that the Virginia State Police have had video
camera-equipped patrol cars for years and that the Fairfax County Police Department is
following suit by equipping their cruisers with similar technology); Beth Kaiman, 14 Seattle
Police Cruisers to Roll With Video Cameras, SEATTLE TIMES, July 17, 2001, at B3 (indicating that
video cameras will be installed in fourteen Seattle police cruisers as a first step toward deciding
whether to equip Seattle's 220 patrol cars with the cameras); Tom McWilliams, Video Cameras
in Police Cars Benefit Citizens, STATE NEWS, July 8, 1999, available at http://www.statenews.com/editionssummer99/071299/op-col2.html
(indicating that Michigan has budgeted
$430,000 for video cameras in police patrol cars around the state and detailing the benefits of
implementing such technology); Ben Schmitt, Squad Cars Get Video Cameras, Detroit Chief
Hails Department's New Technology, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 11, 2000, at 1B (indicating that
Detroit is implementing a video system for more than three hundred of its patrol cars in order to
provide a clear record of police encounters); Jersey Police Trial New Communications System,
available at http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_354503.html (July 18, 2001) (indicating that
police in New Jersey are experimenting with a new communications system using cameras fixed
on patrol cars to beam live video footage recorded at crime scenes to computer screens).
175. See P. J. Huffstutter, Heard on the Beat in Orange County; Police Get Mini Laptops,
L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at D5 (indicating that the Newport Beach Police Department has fullsized, E-mail-capable laptops in all of its patrol cars); Bill Pietrucha, DC Cops Get Wireless
Network, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, Mar. 18, 1998, available at 1998 WL 5032488 (noting
that Washington, D.C. will have installed a network of e-mail capable computers in its police
vehicles by the end of 1998).
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that would aid a judicial determination of probable cause. Given the
insignificant reliance of magistrates on demeanor evidence and the
new ability of law enforcement officials to transmit simultaneous
audio-visual images during the warrant application process, the
176
demeanor criticism clearly is no longer valid.
Another alleged shortcoming concerns the lack of a written
record before issuance of a telephonic warrant. As illustrated by the
state and federal provisions detailed in Parts III and IV, a written
record is generally created after the application is made, leaving the
magistrate with only oral testimony on which to rely. 177 This criticism
is presumably based on the assumption that magistrates do not take
notes of the application conversation and that they lack the capacity to
make accurate determinations of probable cause without a written
record. This criticism, however, is unfounded for a number of reasons.
The first, and most obvious, response is that the written record
criticism extends to only telephonic warrant applications and not to
facsimile or E-mail submissions. This distinction may explain why
some states have enacted facsimile warrant procedures but have made
no provision for oral telephonic procurement. Because both state and
federal procedures require that oral applications be recorded, however,
a permanent record is created, albeit one that is not visually
78
reviewable.1
To help ensure the accuracy of his analysis, a magistrate, while
questioning an applicant, may choose to make note of certain
determinative facts, develop a personal checklist for the requisite
elements of probable cause, or simply question the affiant again as to
specific details of his or her situation. These precautions should be
more than sufficient to protect the validity of issued warrants,
especially in situations with relatively simple factual scenarios. 79 As
emphasized by one California court, "Magistrates must frequently
determine probable cause and make other significant rulings on oral
testimony.' 180 The telephonic procedure thus does not require judicial
officers to perform tasks with which they are not familiar. Admittedly, complex investigations may be ill-suited for oral
application.181 But because warrant requests in such cases "are

176. See Beechen, supra note 26, at 703; Israel, supra note 98, at 261.
177. See supra Parts III, IV; Beechen, supra note 26, at 703.
178. See supra Parts III, IV.
179. See Beechen, supra note 26, at 704-05 (noting that when a simple warrant application is
being made, a written record may add little if anything to aid the magistrate in determining
whether probable cause exists, or to assist him in determining the scope of the allowable search).
180. People v. Peck, 38 Cal. App. 3d 993, 1000 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
181. Beechen, supra note 26, at 703-04.
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usually the culmination of long investigations, speed in securing a
search warrant is not often an essential factor."'182 There is
consequently little need to use the telephonic (as opposed to the
traditional written) procedure for lengthy, detailed applications.18 3
As evidenced by Nebraska's electronic provision, a State may
also require an officer to contact a district attorney before submitting
an oral application. 184 While this may seem counterproductive to an
expedited warrant process, it has the benefit of allowing the applicant,
with help from a trained legal professional, to streamline his
submission, highlight the most crucial facts, and facilitate the
magistrate's determination of probable cause. 185 One commentator has
indicated that "the time expended at this conference will be offset by a
reduction in the time-it actually takes to obtain a warrant application
from the magistrate."'186 Thus, all attorney consultation prior to the
magistrate's review may be viewed as consistent with the goal of an
expedited application while helping to ameliorate the potential
problems resulting from the lack of a written record.
Bypassing the written application requirement is, in reality,
one of the most effective ways to decrease the amount of time needed
to procure a warrant.' 87 As long as another permanent form of
documentation is created, few criticisms of the telephonic procedure
are justified. In situations where time is of the essence and the
validity of a magistrate's probable cause determination will not be
significantly enhanced by a written record, there is little reason not to
forgo the requirement, thus allowing law enforcement officers to
accomplish their objectives in a more effective, constitutionally
permissible manner. 188

182. Id. at 704.
183. Id.
184. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-814.03 (Michie 1999).
185. Beechen, supra note 26, at 705.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 703.
188. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant be based on a written
affidavit. Only "probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation" is necessary. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV; see United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that nothing
in either the Fourth Amendment prevents the oral authorization of search warrants); Beechen,
supra note 26, at 703-05; see generally John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity of, and
Admissibility of Evidence Discovered in, Search Authorized by Judge over Telephone, 38 A.L.R.
4th 1145 (1985) (discussing the validity of telephonically authorized searches and seizures).
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VI. ELECTRONIC SEARCH WARRANTS' IMPACT ON THE EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION

Notwithstanding the foregoing criticisms, electronic search
warrant procedures have an undeniable advantage: By creating an
adaptive, flexible, and expedited method for warrant applications,
they discourage law enforcement officers from engaging in warrantless
searches and make possible a return to the procedural dictates of the
Fourth Amendment. Of particular importance is the potential impact
of the new telephonic procedures on the exigent circumstances
exception.1 8 9 As noted in Part II, the exigency exception allows police
officers to bypass the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement when
there is an immediate need to search for objects or suspects or to
prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, and when obtaining a
warrant by traditional means "would be unreasonable because of
conditions then existing." 190 New electronic search warrant
procedures, however, have changed the equation used by courts in
assessing whether a warrantless search was justified.1 91 As one
commentator has indicated, the reality under Rule 41(c)(2) and similar
state provisions "is that a search warrant is usually only a phone call
away."

192

Several courts have already reached this conclusion. For
example, in United States v. McEachin, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia expressly stated its belief that "courts must also
consider the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant by
telephone in determining whether exigent circumstances exist."1 93 The
California Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in People v.
Blackwell.19 4 In Blackwell, Los Angeles County police officers Mumby
and Boyce were investigating a chemical odor which suggested that
phencyclidine (commonly referred to as PCP) was being manufactured
in a particular apartment. 195 In addition to contacting other officers,
Mumby phoned the fire department but made no attempt to call a
196
judicial officer and request issuance of a telephonic search warrant.
189. Marek, supra note 23, at 36.
190. Id. "When officers have reason to believe that criminal evidence may be destroyed, or
removed, before a warrant can be obtained, the circumstances are considered sufficiently critical
to permit officers to enter a private residence in order to secure the evidence while a warrant is
being sought." United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
191. Marek, supra note 23, at 36.
192. Id. at 38.
193. 670 F.2d 1139, 1146 (1981).
194. 147 Cal. App. 3d 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
195. Id. at 649.
196. Id.
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When the suspects attempted to flush some substances down a toilet,
the officers entered the premises and arrested them. 197 Hours later
and still without a search warrant, the police returned to the scene
and recovered additional chemicals and paraphernalia. 198 When the
defendants moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the
second search, the officers claimed their actions were reasonable
because a warrant would have taken between five and eight hours to
procure and that, in the meantime, the chemicals could have mixed
and created an explosion. 199 The trial court accepted this justification
and found that the warrantless reentry and search were permissible
because of a continuing emergency. 200 The Court of Appeals explicitly
rejected the officers' assertion concerning the time necessary to
procure a search warrant. Instead, it stressed that a telephonic
warrant could have been issued within a shorter period, perhaps in as
little as forty-five minutes. 20 1 As a result, the court suppressed the
evidence seized during the second search and remanded the case. 20 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa also suppressed evidence obtained during the warrantless search
of a defendant's home on the grounds that there was "abundant" time
for the agents to obtain a telephonic warrant. 203 In United States v.
Baker, federal agents had probable cause to arrest Southard, Baker's
codefendant, for drug distribution at approximately three o'clock in
the afternoon and believed that he might flee the vicinity if Baker did
not return by five o'clock that evening. 20 4 Deducting half an hour for
travel time to the defendant's home, the court concluded that the
officers still had nearly an hour and fifteen minutes in which to seek a
warrant. 20 5 While this would have been an inadequate amount of time
to drive to the nearest courthouse, it was more than enough time "to
seek and obtain a warrant from a federal magistrate by telephone." 20 6
The court noted further that if the telephonic procedure had in fact
taken too long, the officers could have stopped and made a warrantless

197. Id.
198. Id. at 650-51.
199. Id. at 650.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 653. The court cited a 1973 study from the San Diego District Attorney's office
which estimated that ninety-five percent of telephonic warrants take less than forty-five minutes
to procure. Id. Miller, supra note 116.
202. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 654.
203. 520 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
204. See id. at 1082.
205. Id. at 1083.
206. Id.
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entry justified by exigent circumstances. 2 7 Because the agents did not
even attempt to obtain a warrant by phone, however, the court held
that the government failed to establish the requisite exigency and
208
granted the motion to suppress.
Despite their potential to greatly circumscribe use of the
exigent circumstances exception, expedited electronic procedures are
not always a viable option. In United States v. Hawkins, for example,
the defendant was observed standing beside a car that was parked on
a public street. 209 After an apparent sale, he carried currency to the
car's trunk and returned to his post without the cash in hand. 2 10 When
the officers arrested him, they removed marijuana from his person,
retrieved narcotics hidden by a nearby adjacent log, and searched the
trunk of the automobile. 211 The court excused the officers' failure to
obtain a warrant under the exigent circumstances exception,
indicating that even the new procedure for obtaining a search warrant
by telephone requires time before a warrant can be issued-a
requesting officer must still "prepare a duplicate original warrant to
be read verbatim to the federal magistrate requested to issue it."212
The court thus concluded that even though the telephonic procedure
was available, exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search
21 3
of the defendant's trunk.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United States v.
Cuaron, also recognized functional limits on adherence to the warrant
requirement via electronic methods. 21 4 In Cuaron, Drug Enforcement
Agents arrested an individual who had sold them a pound of
cocaine. 21 5 Immediately thereafter, the agents began efforts to obtain a
warrant from state court to search the residence from which the drugs
had come. 2 16 Approximately forty minutes after the initial arrest,
however, law enforcement officials decided to secure the residence
without waiting for a search warrant. 217 Cuaron was subsequently
discovered trying to flush a large amount of white powder-later
determined to be cocaine-down the toilet.21 8 After noting that
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 1084 n.3.
Id. at 1084.
Id.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id. at 753 n.4.
Id.
700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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"searches and seizures [conducted] inside a home without a warrant
are presumptively unreasonable," 219 the court indicated that under
certain exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry would be
permissible. 220 It cautioned against expansive use of such an
exception, however, by suggesting that a trial judge who is
determining whether a particular situation falls within that category
should also assess the possibility of obtaining a federal warrant by
telephone.2 21 The procedures delineated in Rule 41(c)(2), nevertheless,
made clear to the court that "more than a simple telephone call is
222
required in order to obtain a warrant based on oral testimony."
Because of the substantial possibility that Cuaron would have
destroyed the drugs if his distributor did not return promptly, the
court held that time constraints justified the officers' proceeding
without a warrant. 223 The court explicitly noted, however, that had the
situation been less exigent, it "would not have hesitated to hold the
'224
warrantless search of Cuaron's house invalid.
These cases clearly demonstrate that the availability of search
warrants by telephone or other electronic means obviates much of the
claimed exigency justification for warrantless searches. 225 Many
factors previously used to invoke the exception, including the distance
from a courthouse, the time required to locate and personally appear
before a magistrate, and the inconvenience of obtaining a warrant
after normal "business hours," are much less compelling now that new
procedures exist. 226 Where electronic provisions are in place, such
objections should no longer be deemed sufficient to characterize a
noncritical situation as exigent. 227 Accordingly, courts should be less
willing to accept excuses for not procuring a warrant in "emergency"
situations and should permit warrantless searches only when the
government can prove that the officer could not have obtained an
electronic warrant in time to avoid the anticipated exigency. 228
219. Id. at 586 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. Id. at 588.
222. Id. at 590.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Marek, supra note 23, at 38; see Beci, supra note 9, at 319-20, 325, 327.
226. Beechen, supra note 26, at 706-10; Marek, supra note 23, at 38; see Miller, supra note
116, at 385.
227. See Beechen, supra note 26, at 717 (indicating that "[tihe timeliness and flexibility of
the oral warrant concept should cause both the courts and the police to reexamine the
circumstances which have been used to circumvent the warrant requirement); Marek, supra note
23, at 46.
228. Beci, supra note 9, at 320; Beechen, supra note 26, at 710; Marek, supra note 23, at 39.
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VII. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY AND THE EASE OF
IMPLEMENTATION

As communication and computer technology continues to
progress, the advantages of electronic warrant provisions are
becoming even more apparent. Over the past decade, there have been
astounding developments in the fields of digital imaging, cellular and
other wireless technology, 229 and miniature personal computing
devices. Manufacturers including Canon, Toshiba, Minolta, Casio, and
Olympus all produce compact, inexpensive digital cameras that can
generate both still and live video images. 230 For a relatively low cost,
police departments may be able to equip officers with similar devices
that would enable them to photograph anything from evidence found
in plain view to a suspect at the scene of a crime. These images could
then be transferred to a police cruiser's personal computer and
digitally attached to either a facsimile or E-mail warrant application.
Even if the officer phoned in a request, the corroborating images could
be sent via fax or E-mail to the courthouse for a magistrate's review.
With respect to officers who are away from their cruisers, Sony,
Hewlett-Packard, Compaq, Palm, Visor, Handspring, and other
companies manufacture a host of personal digital assistants that can

231
be outfitted with cameras and cellular communication technology.
With relatively little effort, standardized warrant application forms
could be uploaded into these palm-sized devices, thus enabling an
officer to submit a search warrant request without ever leaving the
scene of investigation. The issuing magistrate could even send the
actual warrant directly back to the requesting officer who could print

229. See generally Timothy Captain, The Wireless Web: What Are You Missing, LAPTOP, Feb.
2002, at 64-70 (discussing the evolution of the wireless web, the recent developments that have
accelerated wireless data transfer rates, and the implementation of third-generation datatransfer services which will provide transfer rates of up to two megabytes per second and allow
for full-motion wireless video conferencing).
230. Comprehensive listings of these manufacturers' digital imaging products are available
on their respective websites: http://www.usa.canon.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2002),
http://www.dsc.toshiba.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.dimage.minolta.com (last
visited Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.casio.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.olympus.com
(last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
231. For example, Handspring manufactures the Treo ($399), a personal digital assistant
that combines a cellular phone, a pager, and an organizer complete with a keyboard into a
pocket-sized device measuring 4.3 x 2.7 x 0.7 inches and weighing only 5.4 ounces. HewlettPackard makes the Jornada ($599), a pocket-PC similar is size and weight to the Treo that runs
applications such as Microsoft Word and Microsoft Internet Explorer. The Samsung SPH-1300 is
another example of a fully integrated cellular phone and personal digital assistant. Additional
information about these products is available at http://www.handspring.com (lastvisited Feb. 20,
2002), http://www.hp.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2002), and http://www.samsungusa.com (last
visited Feb. 20, 2002).
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a copy in his patrol car or show the homeowner a duplicate warrant as
displayed on the personal digital assistant. 232 Advancement in
encryption technology and digital authentication techniques also
ensure that this equipment could be used with little risk of corruption
233
from an outside source.
At the very least, police officers or their patrol cars could be
equipped with cellular telephones that would enable them to contact a
district attorney or judicial officer not accessible through the existing
police radio network. Many phone manufacturers now make cellular
234
models that are slightly larger than a package of chewing gum.
These devices may be worn with minimal interference to an officer's
mobility. Furthermore, they would eliminate the need for an officer to
locate a landline from which to place his call. Inexpensive cellular
phones could thus maximize the amount of time saved under the
telephonic application process by eliminating the last distance which a
requesting officer must travel-from the investigative scene to the
telephone. These new technologies, if implemented, could help to
reinvigorate the warrant requirement and thus protect citizens'
liberty interests while allowing the government to move quickly in
exigent circumstances. 235

VIII. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE ELECTRONIC PROVISIONS BASED ON THE
FEDERAL MODEL

Although the federal government and a handful of states have
taken the lead with respect to innovation in criminal procedure, the
undeniable advantages of electronic warrants suggest that states
which have not updated their criminal codes should reevaluate their
position. 236 In light of the diversity of geography, size, population
density, financial resources, and myriad other factors among the fifty
states, it would be difficult, if not unwise, to develop a uniform model
for adoption nationwide. Nevertheless, the procedures delineated in
232. All of the devices described supra note 231 are capable of receiving and displaying such
documents.
233. For an excellent overview of encryption technology and its availability, see Richard M.
Nunno, IB96039: Encryption Technology: CongressionalIssues, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS
(July 14, 2000), available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Science/st-40.cfm (indicating that
the ability to break 128-bit encryption (considered strong encryption) has not yet been
demonstrated in the commercial sector).
234. For example, the Nokia 8260, released in 2000, measures 4.1 inches tall and 1.8 inches
wide. See http://www.nokia.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2002).
235. Beci, supra note 9, at 325, 327.
236. See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON

POLICE 95 (1973) (recommending that "every State enact legislation that provides for the
issuance of search warrants pursuant to telephoned petitions and affidavits from police officers").
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Rule 41(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a
general guide that can direct state legislators' efforts to update their
criminal codes. States whose demographics are similar to jurisdictions
that already have adopted electronic warrant statutes may also look to
those particular state codes for additional insight on altering the
federal model to maximize its effectiveness for law enforcement
officers in their locales.
New advancements in computer and cellular technology have
made electronic warrant provisions even more advantageous. By
creating a host of alternative methods that enable warrants to be
obtained in a fraction of the time required under the traditional
procedure, electronic warrant provisions have enabled a return to a
more balanced Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 237 Courts will no
longer be forced to choose between facilitating law enforcement efforts
238
and protecting individual liberties via the warrant requirement.
Rather, both goals may be simultaneously accomplished using the
more flexible and efficient telephonic processes. 239 The various
doctrines used to justify warrantless searches should thus be reviewed
in light of the new standard of warrant availability under the
electronic procedures and circumscribed appropriately. 240 With respect
to the exigent circumstances exception, at a minimum, prosecutors
should be required to demonstrate a much more immediate and
critical emergency to justify the constitutionality of a warrantless
241
search.
Adoption of some form of electronic Warrant provision by states
that have not already done so seems functionally inevitable. In light of
increasing urban sprawl, escalating rural population densities,
frequent traffic problems, and the diffusion of criminal activity
throughout populated areas across the nation, mandating that police
officers physically appear before a magistrate to obtain a warrant
could result in virtual abandonment of the requirement. History has
shown that the continued viability of any system depends on its ability
to adapt to new circumstances. As the Eight Circuit stated in United
States v. Bozada, "If the processes of our government are such that
237. Miller, supra note 116, at 386 (noting that in 1973, sixty-five percent of all telephonic
search warrants took one hour or less from the time when the field officer decided he wanted a
search warrant until the time of issuance, and the remaining thirty-five percent were completed
in less than two hours.).
238. Beci, supra note 9, at 327.
239. See id.
240. Beechen, supra note 26, at 717 (indicating that "the timeliness and flexibility of the oral
warrant concept should cause both the courts and the police to reexamine seriously the
circumstances which have been used to circumvent the warrant requirement").
241. See Marek, supra note 23, at 39.
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police officers are unable to secure search warrants ... then the cure
for that problem is not to sacrifice the Fourth Amendment rights of
242
our citizens, but to streamline the warrant procuring procedure."
Flexible electronic warrant procedures clearly present the most
effective method by which the present system can be updated to
withstand the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Justin:H.Smith*

242. 473 F.2d 389, 394 (8th Cir. 1973); Beechen, supra note 26, at 718.
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